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as evidenced by the purposes for which the land is appropriated.1 9 If the
latter is true, and if the facts demonstrate that it is reasonable to expect that
a reservation of this nature would be inconsistent with the probable use of the
land by the state, then, of course, the party defendant will in any subsequent
proceedings be presumed to have recovered full compensation for the depriva-
tion of a right of access to the public way.2 0 Admittedly this rule, which is
consistent with the result of the principal case, places on a defendant the risk
of seeing that his compensation covers any such appropriation; and yet the
burden is hardly greater than that resting upon the grantee of an estate which
has no means of access unless it be over the land retained by the grantor.
C. D. L.
THE VICARIOus LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CoRPoRATiNs.-Plaintiff, a paying
patient in defendant charitable hospital, was being removed in its ambulance
to her home. Because of the negligence of the driver, the ambulance collided
with another vehicle, and plaintiff received injuries, for which she seeks to
recover damages in this action against the hospital. Held, a charitable cor-
poration is liable for the torts of its mere servants, even though it has exer-
cised due care in selecting them.1
The rule generally prevailing is that the master is liable for all harm
caused by the tortious conduct of his servants committed while acting within
the scope of the employment.2 The true basis of this rule is public policy,
rather than merely pecuniary profit to the master or some similar idea.8 The
19 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis R. Co. v. Smith (1911),
177 Ind. 524, 97 N. E. 164. The dissenting opinion cites the following cases
for the contra proposition, but they are distinguishable in spite of their broad
language upon one ground or another: Prowattain v. City of Phila. (Penn.
1886), 4 A. 806. (The rule of the court: where land is taken by virtue of the
power of eminent domain for a purpose inconsistent with the existence of a
right of way, no way of necessity is created by implication); Flagg v. Town
of Concord (1916), 222 Mass. 569, 111 N. E. 369 (the court said: the extent
of the taking and the rights of the taker are fixed by the purposes for which
the land is condemned-further it is not clearly apparent that a way of neces-
sity is actually involved); Cedar Rapids, I., F., and N. W. R. Co. v. Ray-
mond (1887), 37 Minn. 204, 33 N. W. 704 (governed by statute); St. Louis,
Keokuk, and Northwestern R. Co. v. Clark (1894), 121 Mo. 169, 195, 25 S. W.
192, 906, 26 L. R. A. 751 (no reasonable necessity for an open crossing as a close
crossing was provided for by statute); Atchison T. and S. F. R. Co. v. Con-
Ion (1901), 62 Kan. 416, 63 P. 432, 53 L. R. A. 781 (exception in the convey-
ance operated to terminate any right of way that might have been impliedly
reserved to plaintiff's grantor) ; Ham v. City of Salem (1868), 100 Mass. 350
(no showing of reasonable necessity). Goggins v. Boston and A. R. Co. (1892),
155 Mass. 505, 30 N. E. 71, remains, however, directly opposed to the views
here expressed.
20 State v. Patten (Ind. 1936), 199 N. E. 577; New Jersey, Indiana and
Illinois R. Co. v. Tutt (1907), 168 Ind. 205, 80 N. E. 420.
1 Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital et al. (1937), 273 N. Y.
163, 7 N. E. (2d) 28.
2 Harper, Law of Torts, Sec. 291.
3 H. J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916), 26 Yale L. J. 105,
at 111.
RECENT CASE NOTES
problem now before us is to determine to what extent this doctrine of respondeat
superior applies to charitable corporations. For, a clear understanding of the
matter, one must remember that when there has been negligence in the selec-
tion or retention of a servant, the negligence involved is that of" the master;
the question of vicarious liability arises where there is tortious conduct on
the part of the servant.
Various theories have been propounded in favor of exempting charitable
corporations from tort liability. The oldest of these is the "trust fund" doc-
trine, originating in an English case, 4 since completely overruled, 5 and founded
on the proposition that the funds of a charity should not be diverted from the
purposes for which the fund was established. No question of vicarious liability
arises under this view, because the corporation is not liable in tort either for
its own negligence in selecting servants,6 or for the negligence of the servants
themselves.7 The comparatively few states that follow this rule deny recovery
to strangers, 8 invitees,9 - and employees,' 0 as well as to recipients of the
charitable aid.11
Some courts have refused to grant vicarious liability on the ground that
the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to charities, because they
are performing a quasi-governmental function and are not run for profit.12
4 Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross (1846), 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep.
1508.
5 "Mersey Docks & Harbour Board" Trustees v. Gibbs (1864-), L. R. 1
Eng. & Irish App. Cas. 93, affirmed (1866), 11 H. L. Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep.
1500; Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew Hosp. (1909) 2 K. B. 820.
6Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital (1920), 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E.
392; Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n (1921), 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577.
7 johnston v. City of Chicago (1913), 258 I1. 494, 101 N. E. 960; Parks v.
Northwestern University (1905), 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991; Williams Adm'x
v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick (1928), 223 Ky. 355,
3 S. W. (2d) 753 (even though the hospital carried indemnity insurance).
8 Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd (1888), 120 Pa. 624, 15 A. 553; Johnston v. City
of Chicago (1913), 258 I1. 494, 101 N. E. 960 (dictum).
9 Glaser v. Congregational Kehillath Israel (1928), 263 Mass. 435, 161
N. E. 619; Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hospital (1917),
130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301; Hill v. President and Trustees of Tualatin Academy
and Pacific University et al. (1912), 61 Ore. 190, 121 P. 901.
1OZoulalian v. New England Sanatorium & Benevolent Ass'n (1918); 230
Mass. 102, 119 N. E. 686; Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes (1933), 284 Mass.
300, 187 N. E. 557.
"lParks v. Northwestern University (1905), 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991;
Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis (1910), 227 Pa. 254, 75 A. 1087; Brown v.
St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n (1929), 85 Colo. 167, 274 P. 740; Jensen v. Maine
Eye & Ear Infirmary (1910), 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898; Perry v. House of
Refuge (1884), 63 Md. 20. See also, Bougon v. Volunteers of America (La.,
App., 1934), 151 So. 797.
12 Bachman v. Y. W. C. A. (1922), 179 Wis. 178, 191 N. W. 751; Hearns
v. Waterbury Hospital (1895), 66 Conn. 98, 33 A. 595 (the public policy behind
respondeat superior does not apply to charities); Vermillion v. Women's. Col-
lege of Due West (1916), 104 S. C. 197, 88 S. E. 649; Steele et ux. v. St,
Joseph's Hospital (Tex. Civ. App., 1933), 60 S. W. (2d) 1083.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Here there is no recovery allowed, either to patients13 or strangers,14 unless
the corporation itself has been negligent in the selection of its agents.15
Probably a majority of the states have adopted the "implied waiver"
theory, i. e., that persons who seek the services of a charitable corporation
impliedly waive any right to hold it for damages. 16 Under this view there
is vicarious liability as to everyone except the patient.17 As to him, the cor-
poration is liable only in case it has failed to exercise due care in selecting
the servant-its own negligence. 1 8
Other decisions have been based upon the flexible "public policy" doctrine.
As a matter of fact, public policy seems to be the underlying principle of all
the theories of exemption; but the judges have been reluctant to base their
reasoning solely on such an elastic principle. It is founded on the premise
that it is good public policy to foster charitable institutions and to protect
their resources from litigation.19 A few courts hold that public policy favors
absolute exemption of charities from tort liability;20 and under such a view
there would not be liability, vicarious or otherwise. However, the majority
in this group hold that public policy denies recovery only to recipients of the
charity's bounty and that even they can recover if there has been negligence
on the part of the charity itself in selecting the servant.2 1 In other words,
13 Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium of Tucson v. Wilson
(Ariz., 1935), 46 P. (2d) 118; Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital (1895), 66 Conn.
98, 33 A. 595.
14 Bachman v. Y. W. C. A. (1922), 179 Wis. 178, 191 N. W. 751.
15 Taylor v. Flower Deaconness Home and Hospital (1922), 104 Ohio St.
61, 135 N. E. 287. Wisconsin grants exemption even where there has been
negligence in selecting the servants. Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess
Soc. of Wisconsin (1935), 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476.
16 This theory was brought into prominence in Powers v. Massachusetts
Homoeopathic Hospital (C. C. A. Ist, 1901), 109 Fed. 294, cert. denied (1901),
183 U. S. 695, 22 S. Ct. 932, 46 L. Ed. 394. Bruce v. Y. M. C. A. (1929), 51
Nev. 372, 277 P. 798; Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church (1907),
147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 951; Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of the In-
carnate Word (La. App., 1929), 123 So. 466.
17Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church (1907), 147 Mich. 230,
110 N. W. 951. See, also, Phoenix Assur. Co., Ltd., of London v. Salvation
Army (1927), 83 Cal. App. 470, 256 P. 1106.
18 Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital (1931), 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P. (2d)
520; Thomas v. German General Benevolent Society (1914), 168 Cal. 183,
141 P. 1186.
19 Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary (1910), 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898.2 OEads v. Y. W. C. A. (1930), 325 Mo. 577, 29 S. W. (2d) 701; Ver-
million v. Woman's College of Due West (1916), 104- S. C. 197, 88 S. E. 649;
New Jersey seems to grant exemption as to both patients and invitees when
there has been due care in selecting the servant, but not to strangers. Com-
pare Boeckel v. Orange Memorial Hospital (1932), 108 N. J. Law 453, 158 A.
832, affirmed 110 N. J. Law 509, 166 A. 146 (invitee), with Simmons v. Wiley
Methodist Episcopal Church (1934), 112 N. J. Law 129, 170 A. 237 (stranger).
21 Weston's Administrator v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul (1921), 131
Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785 at 792; Cashman v. Meridien Hospital (1933), 117 Conn.
585, 169 A. 915; Cohen v. General Hospital Soc. of Connecticut (1931), 113
Conn. 198, 154 A. 435; Simmons v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church (1934),
112 N. J. Law 129, 170 A. 237; Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. Duvelius
(1930), 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N. E. 737 (court here did not select any one
theory, evidently on the ground that public policy favored this result); Carver
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they reach the same result as the waiver theory without encountering many of
the difficulties which logically arise when the fiction of implied waiver is
applied.
A few states, notably Minnesota, have taken the view that these organiza-
tions are under the same liability as private businesses.2 2 The instant case
seems to fall into this group, at least insofar as the negligent conduct of mere
employees is concerned. It may be that New York will distinguish between
the torts of mere employees and those of doctors, on the ground that the latter
are independent contractors. 23
Some courts, not ordinarily permitting recovery, hold the corporation liable
in certain unusual situations. For example, it has been held that there is lia-
bility where the charity creates a nuisance.2 4 Even states following the trust
fund theory have permitted recovery where the tort resulted from the use of
trust property in private business and not primarily for trust purposes. 25
While the fact that a person is a paying patient is usually held to be imma-
terial, 25 some jurisdictions allow recovery to paying patients, 27 at least up to
Chiropractic College v. Armstrong (1924), 103 Okla. 123, 229 P. 641 (dictum
to the effect that this result is law, but no theory is adopted) ; Roberts v. Ohio
Valley General Hospital (1925), 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318 (public- policy
and waiver seem to have been relied upon); Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium
& Benevolent Ass'n (1912), 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (follows the general
doctrine without selecting a theory).
22 Mclnerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n of Duluth (1913), 122 Minn. 10,
141 N. W. 837; Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, etc. (1920),
144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699; Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal CJurch
(1928), 174 Minn. 394, 219 N. W. 463; Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital
(1880), 12 R. 1. 411 (this was changed by statute; see General Laws of
Rhode Island (1923), Ch. 248, Sec. 95, p. 1011); Tucker v,. Mobile Infirmary
Ass'n (1915), 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (at least insofar as pay patients are con-
cerned) ; and see City of Shawnee v. Roush (1923), 101 Okla. 60, 223 P. 354
(pay patient).
23 See Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospital (1914), 211 N. Y.
125, 105 N. E. 92, and Hamburger y. Cornell University (1925), 240 N. Y.
328, 148 N. E. 539.
24 Love v. Nashville Agricultural and Normal Institute (1922), 146 Tenn.
550, 243 S. W. 304-; Peden v. Furman University (1930), 155 S. C. 1, 151
S. E. 907. See also, Leavell v. Western Kentucky Asylum for the Insane
(1906), 122 Ky. 213, 91 S. W. 971.
25 Gamble v. Vanderbilt University (1918), 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S. W. 510;
McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op. Industries and Stores, Inc. (1930), 272
Mass. 121, 172 N. E. 68; Winnemore v. Philadelphia (1902), 18 Pa. Super.
625; Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes (1933), 284 Mass. 300, 187 N. E. 557.25Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital (1920), 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E.
392; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis (1910), 227 Pa. 254, 75 A. 1087; Stonaker
v. Big Sisters Hospital (1931), 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P. (2d) 520; Barr v.
Brooklyn Children's Aid Soc. (1921), 190 N. Y. S. 296; Mikota v. Sisters of
Mercy (1918), 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219; Southern Methodist Hospital
and Sanatorium of Tucson v. Wilson (Ariz., 1935), 46 P. (2d) 118; McLeod
v. St. Thomas Hospital (Tenn., 1936), 95 S. W. (2d) 917; Hogan v. Chicago
Lying-In Hospital & Dispensary (1929), 335 IIl. 42, 166 N. E. 461, affirming
247 Il. App. 331; Enell v. Baptist Hospital (Tex. Civ. App., 1932), 45 S. W.
(2d) 395; Duncan v. Nebraska Sanatorium Benev. Ass'n (1912), 92 Neb. 162,
137 N. W. 1120.
27 See Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n (1915), 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4,
and City of Shawnee v. Roush (1923), 101 Okla. 60, 223 P. 354.
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the amount that the corporation has collected from all such patients.2 8
The present state of the law, therefore, is that in a few states charitable
trusts are under no tort liability; in some others they are subject to the same
vicarious liability as ordinary employers; but in the large majority they are
exempt only from vicarious liability for injuries inflicted upon their patients. 29
The only ground for recovery the patient has is that the corporation itself has
been negligent in performing its non-delegable duty of selecting servants and
employees.
The Indiana cases follow the waiver theory.3 0 The trust is exempt from
tort liability for injuries to patients, even though they pay for the services,3 1
but is liable to strangers or invitees. 3 2 In order to recover, a patient must
prove negligence on the part of the charity in selecting its agents.83
The instant case, in applying the doctrine of respondeat superior to chari-
ties, follows the modern trend. At first, absolute exemption from tort liability
was given, but that soon gave way to the view that strangers could recover.
This case represents the ultimate step, that there" is complete liability. Many
writers believe that it would be desirable to discard all these illogical theories
of exemption and adopt the view which the instant case takes.3 4 Most char-
itable trusts are highly endowed and are better able to bear this comparatively
small burden than the injured individual. Such a result, also, seems better for
reasons of public policy. When the charity is permitted to escape liability for
an injury it has inflicted, it has, completely failed its purpose; instead of
removing a burden from the State, it has added one.
The importance of the case at hand lies in the fact that it declares the
intention of the New York courts to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior
to charitable corporations where the tort is committed by a mere employee
while acting in that capacity. There is ample reason to believe that other
courts will be influenced by this progressive view, because the New York
decisions are considered to be the leading authorities in this branch of law.
They were quick to seize upon the reasoning of Powers v. Massachusetts
Homoeopathic Hospita 3 5 in extending liability to strangers. Can it be that
they will meet the demands of present conditions and follow New York in
extending liability even to patients?
W. I. M.
28 Morton v. Savannah Hospital (1918), 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. S. 887; St.
Mary's Academy of Sisters of Loretto of City of Denver v. Solomon (1925),
77 Colo. 463, 238 P. 22 (judgment valid as to property not constituting trust
fund).
29 11 C. J., p. 374. Liability of Privately Conducted Charity for Personal
Injuries (1921), 14 A. L. R. 572; (1923), 23 A. L. R. 923; (1924), 30 A. L. R.
455; (1924), 33 A. L. R. 1369; (1926), 42 A. L. R. 971; (1929), 62 A. L. R.
724; (1933), 86 A. L. R. 491.
80 Although Williams v. City of Indianapolis (1901), 26 Ind. App. 628,
60 N. E. 367, apparently favored the trust fund theory, St. Vincent's Hospital
v. Stine (1924), 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537, made it clear that such was not
the test and fell in line with those cases supporting the waiver doctrine.
31 St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine (1924), 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537.
32Winona Technical Institute, at Indianapolis v. Stolte (1909), 173 Ind.
39, 89 N. E. 393.
is St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine (1924), 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537; Old
Folks' and Orphan Children's Home v. Roberts (1925), 83 Ind. App. 546, 149
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N. E. 188; Old Folks' and Orphan Children's Home of Church of the Brethren
of Middle District of Indiana v. Roberts (1930), 91 Ind. App. 533, 171 N. E. 10.
34 J. F. Sefl, Liability of Private Charitable Corporations for the Torts of
Their Agents and Servants (1936), 2 John Marshall L. Q. 234; J. A. Apple-
man, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions (1936), 22 American Bar
Assoc. J. 48; L. W. Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities (1928), 77 Uni-
versity of Pa. L. Rev. 191; Charitable Institutions-Liability for Torts of Their
Agents (1935), 22 Va. L. Rev. 58. See also, Charities-Liability of Charitable
Corporations for Torts of Their Servants (1932), 10 Tennessee L. Rev. 230.
35 (C. C. A. lst 1901), 109 Fed. 294, 65 L. R. A. 372, cert. denied (1901),
183 U. S. 695, 22 S. Ct. 932, 46 L. Ed. 394.
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